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PERSUASION IN NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION
Here are a few initial reflections on some challenges and nuances of studying persuasion. Each is subject to considerable anecdotal and scholarly study.
A working description of 'persuasion' is -an attempt to change the beliefs, emotions and behaviours (including language) of others. Of course, persuasion can be achieved by advertisements; biographies; torture; spanking; warfare; dreams; drugs; flattery; and counselling.
(1) The ubiquitous complexity, and sometimes mystery, of human behaviour, beliefs and emotions, means that any insights and frameworks are fragile and tentative. Nevertheless, a conscious framework is more helpful to planning and correction than a subconscious framework. (2) Attempted persuasive behaviours will have varying degrees of 'success' on different targets. A zealot conflict-junkie with 'nothing to lose' will not be persuaded by the usual, or perhaps any, skilled persuasive routines. (3) The above comment applies especially to attempted communication and persuasion across substantially different cultures. Persuasive methods chosen, and degrees of effectiveness, vary dramatically from culture to culture.
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(4) All human beings are 'trapped' to different degrees, by beliefs, emotions and behaviours, which are outside systems of rational analysis (irrational, arational or beyond rationality). 3 It is a particular challenge in negotiation to diagnose 'rationally' whether perceived own or other irrationality is feigned (good cop -bad cop), temporary, 'real', or cultural; and what array of persuasive strategies might work against irrationality. For example, a standard strategy is to 'bring a wise friend', who is then subject to normal persuasion techniques. (5) Persuasion is attempted and will have varying degrees of 'success' with a range of people involved in any negotiation or mediation including: (a) within a team of hawks, doves and moderates, who are either 'present' or in the shadows (sometimes known as 'tribes', cheer squads or constituents).
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(b) between teams of hawks, doves and moderates, who are again either present or elsewhere such as shareholders, bosses, patriarchs or new spouses. (c) with self! The negotiation environment is also key for persuading or rationalising to self that decision made is OK, satisfactory, wise or even excellent. 'Am I missing something here'; 'This is what I am thinking -am I wrong?' 'Why should I move? Can you help me?' (d) with a mediator, especially a mediator of the 'evaluative' type. 5 If an evaluative mediator can be swayed or persuaded, (s)he will then pass on the persuasion via practised mediator persuasion techniques. (6) Persuasion is attempted via a variety of venues and forms -your place; my place;
neutral place; open or closed to publicity; secretly or publicly; by conversation; letters; phone; email; single meeting; multiple meetings; long or short; with or without extensive preparation; years before; or the day before a court determination; with or without the assistance of a mediator or chairperson.
Persuasive techniques chosen will usually differ according to these variables. (7) A variety of different, though overlapping, persuasive techniques are usually attempted at the different stages of any negotiation -for example: -just re-opening communication after 'hostilities' or deadlock.
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-persuading representatives to 'come to a table' or exchange correspondence and problem solve. -opening speeches at any meeting, phone call or initial interchange of correspondence. -vigorous interactive debates, tense 'doubt-creation' mid-way through any negotiation. -subtle, and non-so-subtle strategies for crossing the last gap at the end of a negotiation when nerves are frayed and anger or despair is again escalating.
(8) Many activities could be classified as 'pre-persuasion'; or 'setting the scene for persuasion'; or 'merely emotional or procedural pre-conditions' to persuasion. For example: preparatory documents; exchanged summaries; graphs; charts; preparatory phone calls; politeness or not; food or not; gracious hosts or not; bring a supporter or not; etc might be classified as 'pre-persuasion'. However, the writer disagrees with such artificial boundaries and is convinced that potential 'persuasion' and 'changed or confirmed perceptions' are occurring with every casual or formal encounter between negotiators and their constituents. (9) Negotiators use different, though again, overlapping persuasion techniques not only to reach a 'settlement', but also one that is durable.
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(10) A persuader can be motivated predominantly by perceived or actual self-interest; (eg: 'I want to make a profit'; 'I will not be beaten by you') or predominantly by perceived or actual interests in others; ('this early settlement/medicine/exercise will assist you to recover'; 'this offer is so generous because I genuinely want to assist you') or a combination of both self-interest and interest in others. (11) 'The right offer at the wrong time is the wrong offer'. An entirely persuasive message sent will not be received, unless and until the other party acquires the ears to hear.
II
A COMPOSITE MODEL OF A PERSUASIVE LAWYER-NEGOTIATOR I will begin with a description of the features of several lawyers whom the writer has anecdotally observed to be repetitively 'persuasive' and 'successful' in negotiations within Australia. (NB they too have a percentage of perceived 'failures'). Each feature is worthy of several PhD theses. Each feature is also supported by a host of more systematic studies in psychology, communication and negotiation, though these model lawyers probably have read only few if any of such studies.
The broad sweep of these features indicates the complexity of a notion such as 'persuasion'.
These 'persuasive' and highly competent negotiators exhibit the following features:
• A sustained reputation for the features which follow! • Attentive listening and summarising skills • Detailed preparation and intra-team training • Gracious hosts • Articulated awareness and flexibility about procedural options during negotiation • Self-deprecating humour (eg: 'I became a lawyer because I cannot add'; 'I forgot to take my pills again this morning')
• A balance of focus on big goals (the forest) and fine detail (the trees)
• Stunning memories for detail and instant ability to produce copies of key documents Again, it must be emphasised that the to and fro delivery of these routine attempts to create doubt, take place with many complex variations -who, when, where, aggressively or diplomatically, in whose presence, straight to the point or by nuance, by metaphor or story, with graphs and charts, in writing of one or hundreds of pages, with speeches or chatter, with humour or solemnity, in one or several 'languages', once or repetitively over many exchanges, in a sombre or comfortable environment, by letter, phone or email, with total honesty, limited disclosure or degrees of deception, with positive or negative language.
This process of doubt-creation attempts to challenge beliefs, behaviours and emotions, which are attached to each party's preferred solution(s).
B

Creating Doubt about Rights, Goals and Power
Negotiators use 'rights, power and goals' talk interchangeably as they attempt to create doubt. These three categories of rights, power and goals overlap. Nevertheless, it is very useful to attempt to categorise key allegedly persuasive propositions -for example, 'rights' talk may be more persuasive for lawyers, and 'goals' and 'risk' talk more persuasive for business people. 'Rights' can be described as a series of guesses about the range of benefits and losses, which may result from legal process and decision-making. As such, guesses require considerable legal knowledge and expertise, they should ideally come from the minds and mouths of experienced and reputable lawyers in order to have a degree of
RIGHTS GOALS
POWER
RIGHTS GOALS POWER persuasiveness. Clients who talk about 'justice', 'rights', 'entitlements' or 'fairness' are usually very unpersuasive, even though such concepts may have high personal importance.
'Rights' talk is sometimes called 'bargaining in the shadow of the law (and its legal procedures)'.
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The shadow of the law involves at least the trilogy of doubts of uncertainty, expense and delay. Thus, the writer as mediator has supervised numerous mediations where very competent lawyers announce quietly: 'Can I make it clear that I have advised my client that (s)he will receive between 20-40% of the estate; incurring legal costs between $80 000 and $120 000; with delay of between 15-24 months'.
Apart from the standard trilogy of risks, there are many other routine doubts attached to litigation, which are recited at negotiations, and which quickly overlap with 'goals' doubts.
'RIGHTS' TALK is routinely subdivided into the following elements or pre-conditions to guessing how a decision-maker might behave in the future: 
Goals Talk
A 'goal' is a known or presumed commercial or personal interest of all or some of the parties to the negotiation. Skilful negotiators are adept at switching between 'rights' talk and 'goals' talk. Business people seem to be more comfortable with (and more persuaded by) goals and risks talk. These concepts reflect their training and expertise, and they do not lose control to the insider knowledge and jargon attached to discussions of legal rights.
Skilful negotiators also seem to be comfortable switching language back and forth between personal and commercial 'goals' and 'risks', according to which style appears to appeal to a particular audience. The following chart gives examples of how common goal and risk language can be swapped by skilled persuaders. it is often impossible to predict the outcome of litigation with a high degree of confidence. Disagreements on the law occur even in the High Court. An apparently strong case can be lost if evidence is not accepted, and it is often difficult to forecast how a witness will act in the witness-box. Many steps in the curial process involve value judgments, discretionary decisions and other subjective determinations which are inherently unpredictable. Even well-organized, efficient courts cannot routinely produce quick decisions, and appeals further delay finality. Factors personal to a client and any inequality between the client and other parties to the dispute are also potentially material. Litigation is highly stressful for most people and notoriously expensive. An obligation on a litigant to pay the costs of another party in addition to his or her own costs can be financially ruinous. Further, time spent by parties and witnesses in connection with litigation cannot be devoted to other, productive activities. Consideration of a range of competing factors such as these can reasonably lead rational people to different conclusions concerning the best course to follow.
Goal
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Power Talk 'Power' can be described as the actual or perceived ability to influence the emotions, beliefs and behaviours of another person. Although actual or perceived power as a persuasive force often overlaps with rights and goal/risk talk, it is again important to consider examples of 'power' as separate categories of persuasion. There are two important features of power as a potential persuasive force -first, power is multilayered and has many forms; secondly, power shifts with time and circumstance. For example, a person who threatens to use publicity may be strongest before the actual disclosure to the media. This anecdotal reflection undoubtedly reflects the narrow context of the writer's profession as a mediator predominantly in high conflict, lawyer involved mediations and negotiations in the shadow of the legal system.
The writer has observed that, if presented diplomatically by and to the 'right' team members at the time when the hearers have ears to hear, (important preconditions!), 'power' propositions 6, 23, 24 and 25 are most persuasive -that is, scorched earth; skeletons-in-closets; alternative fall-back; and future relationship. I have seen frequent mutual disasters when these powerful levers have been perceived as bluffs, or spoken with cathartic and inflammatory clumsiness, at the wrong time.
While standard rituals of rights, power and goals talk are occurring, it is not clear what is being communicated. The standard messages being sent, are not necessarily being heard. There is a lot of 'noise' and blah-blah.
What are the purposes of this noise? Perhaps it is habit; or a hangover from barristerial advocacy; or nervous chatter; or a hired mouth attempting to justify fees; or a naïve hope that something in the shotgun of blather may stick; or be ubiquitous good copbad cop routine; or insightful knowledge that repetition is the essence of learning.
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Cialdini's Sales Levers
Other writers create overlapping, but some different categories of persuasion, apart from the rights, goals (risks), and power categories set out above. For example, in the important book by Robert Cialdini, Influence -Science and Practice, 19 Cialdini identifies the six most effective persuasive 'levers' in the areas of national and international sales. They are: The writer has found Cialdini's insights to be very helpful, as a mediator trying to set up negotiation meetings, and reframe client's goals and risks. In Appendix B are some illustrations of practical applications of these concepts.
D
Persuasion and Pause
One of the standard responses to the doubt creation dance is adjournment or pause.
Where there is predictable resistance to a preferred negotiated outcome, one or more of the disappointed parties declares:
• 'I will get further instructions from my clients.'
• 'We are getting nowhere; this is a waste of time.'
• 'We cannot make a decision until we have more clarity about …' (the value of a business, cash flow, what a witness will say etc).
The motives for adjournment are many -laziness; disorganisation; fear of regrets; fear of armchair antics; need for more 'facts'; confusion or ambush due to new information received; need to 'sign up' one's own client for self protection; attractive status quo to retreat to during adjournment; hope that adjournment will escalate pressure; deep grief at emerging less-than-hoped-for agreement; hope against hope that 'something will change' during the pause etc.
This catalogue of possible motives may help to explain why adjournment and procrastination are such popular and predictable responses to allegedly persuasive 'doubt creation'. That is also why some lawyers (and auctioneers) are unwilling to 'sink costs' into a series of negotiation meetings, as a discontented party can so readily escape pressure by adjournment. Better to wait until the door of the court (or auction?) when all escape routes are closed -cut a deal or risk some 'losses' immediately before a judge (most judges will punish last minute attempts to adjourn).
That is, routine 'persuasion' becomes more effective as easy fall-back options such as adjournment diminish.
E (Conscious) Deception of Others in Negotiation and its Shifting Boundaries
Attempts to create doubt via rights, goals and power talk between parties are often muted by mutual suspicion and deception. Anecdote and research 20 show clearly that negotiators, including the majority of lawyers, standardly lie -'This is my bottom line'; 'This is my best offer'; 'This is a reasonable offer'; 'If you don't accept this offer, I have advised my client to go to court'; 'My client is entitled to 60%'; 'A judge would never accept that argument' etc; or make negligent statements -'the accounts support what I'm saying'; 'there are no more relevant documents'; 'my client is scrupulously honest' etc. Accordingly, comments which should theoretically create doubt and be persuasive to some extent, are frequently ignored in the babble or perception of deception.
21 Such inconvenient truths often lead to the response that these orthodox negotiation lies are 'merely' harmless ritualistic puffery.
It is arguable that these intentionally or negligently false statements are both illegal for all negotiators in Australia 22 and unethical for lawyers 23 despite being common. 
Self-Deception -An Underlying Theme
The previous framework and analysis of this paper implies that we as human negotiators are a rational and organised species, carefully articulating and weighing lists of visible rights, goals and power. This may be true sometimes. More frequently, we appear to be the victims (or beneficiaries) of our own self delusions and tricks of mind and emotion. The errors of confidence abound.
Psychological studies give many helpful insights into the process of human decisionmaking, and how we are all prone to error. These tendencies to err are sometimes collected under the labels of 'cognitive heuristics', or 'decision-making shortcuts' or more simply, 'decision traps'. Life is so complex, we all have inbuilt shortcuts to manage this complexity.
Most of these decision traps profoundly influence negotiation decisions. In other words, all the parties to the 'decision-making' of negotiation, including a mediator, are prone to delusion and self-deception. This is particularly challenging, as the opposition is trying to deceive me, and at the same time, I am already self-deceived! Deception, delusion and double-talk abound. How am I supposed to make a wise decision?
Again, when and how should a mediator, or a team moderate, educate himself/herself/the parties/their tribal members, about these lurking decision-making demons?
The stereotype of the persuasive negotiator set out at the beginning of this paper, usually has not studied psychology. However, the school of hard knocks has taught him/her about the constant fallibility of human decision-making. This wisdom is then reflected in the ubiquitous phrases:
• 'On my understanding.'
• 'Correct me if I'm wrong…'
• 'Am I missing something…'
• 'Only fools rush in…'
• 'What assumptions are we making here?'
• 'I've been wrong many times before, so…'
• 'On what evidence do you base that statement…'
Set out below are examples of some of the decision traps, which we have all seen at work in our own lives, and in daily, national and international negotiations.
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Decision-Making Shortcuts and Traps (for Negotiators and Others) 24
The ANCHORING TRAP: Over-relying on First Thoughts
The SUNK-COST TRAP ( 12. 'If we keep wearing them down with paper, they will give in before the court hearing'. 13. 'I told you that they are not to be trusted -they did not answer my letter; arrived late for the meeting; and now sit outside talking and snickering obviously unprepared'. 14. 'We handle hundreds of these cases. We know what we are doing'. 15. 'From my experiences in court, judges do not like emotional witnesses'. 16. 'Big banks which hire large law firms rarely lose in court. They are too powerful.
Just look at the cases over the last 10 years'.
G
Procedural and Emotional Awareness and Skills
The stereotype excellent negotiator, described at the beginning of the paper, has a number of other micro behaviours, which relate to procedure and emotions for all parties involved.
When a negotiator talks, or writes about perceived substantive rights, goals and power, this occurs amidst behaviour and language relating to procedure and emotions.
This behaviour, or the absence thereof, relating to 'intangibles', has a profoundly persuasive effect on the majority of negotiators. Of course, it is possible only to give a few conceptual and linguistic illustrations of such a vast topic. Again, it is important to emphasise that each of these illustrations vary in effect from one culture to another. These illustrated behaviours provide the persuasive context in which the substantive messages are wrapped.
Listening respectfully: 'uh-huh'; 'yes'; 'please continue'; nodding; appropriate eye contact.
Acknowledging emotion: 'I can see that you felt "strongly"; "frustrated"; "angry"; "disappointed"; "concerned" etc'.
Substance Procedure Emotions
Reframing: 'The only solution you can see at present is creating distance between you'; 'You lost some respect for each other'; 'You are hoping for a big financial payout'; 'You have had many differences in the past' etc.
Summarising: 'Have I understood correctly, there are three reasons…?' 'So you believe we have four major risks…'; 'So you are suggesting that that figure is justified by five arguments'; etc.
Questions: Especially - 
H
Procedural Awareness
A persuasive negotiator often appears to 'rise above' the immediate substantive and emotional discussions occurring in person or by mail, and open a reflective discussion about procedure. This procedural awareness, or role as a quasi-mediator, is attractive as negotiators often experience intense frustration and 'loss' -'we are going nowhere'; 'we have been over this before'; 'she is a broken record'; 'tell us something new'; 'this is another dead end'; 'they are just stonewalling us'; 'I told you that this would be a waste of time'; etc.
The procedural freak rises above the fray, either preventively or reactively with an array of standard colloquial pauses, expressed via bumbling Columbo or articulate diplomat.
• 'I was wondering, it would be helpful to me if…'
• 'I am lost; could we try to answer…'
• 'I know that I'm a bit slow, but could you summarise that for me again Bill'.
• 'Before we look at our differences, could I suggest that we have some things in common'.
• 'How would you like to run the meeting today? Can I suggest some steps which have been helpful, at least to me, in the past?'
• 'We have been on that topic for 15 minutes (or 15 emails) -could we leave it for the moment, and come back to it later?'
• 'Can I ask a question?'
• 'Could Mary and I write up an agenda during the tea break?'
• 'If you threaten my client, what do you expect him to do? Would it be predictable for him to respond in kind?'
• 'We have been swapping threats for a while; could we now brainstorm some solutions and we can return to the threats later.'
• 'Could the accountants jointly address us on that topic for say 15 minutes so that we can understand why they are so far apart?'
• 'Would you be prepared to ask a small sub-committee to list the options and recommend their top choice?'
• 'Can you suggest to me David, how I could sell that offer to my client and her constituents? I know it is late, but at the moment I cannot think of one persuasive reason.'
• 'I don't know about you, but I need some coffee…'
• 'I will not even mention that offer to my client; it is petrol on the fire.'
• 'Is there any way we can avoid the usual routine of extreme offers, and then months of chipping away at each other? As a lawyer, I need a new tennis court, but our clients may have better things to do with their money.'
It is easy to acknowledge the importance of concepts such as procedural skill and emotional awareness. However, this is like reading a book about golf. There remains years of supervised practice, before these 'persuasive' concepts are reflected in a repertoire of language and negotiation 'instincts', while negotiating under pressure.
IV CONCLUSION
The anecdotal and more systematic study of persuasion methods used in negotiation is both helpful and daunting.
It is helpful to know what range of tactics and language to practise, and what is probably being attempted by your counterparts. 'Competence' is demystified to some extent.
However, this study is also daunting. There are so many unknown variables in the persuasion soup, and diagnostically it is a challenge to use even the known and practised persuasive methods at the 'right' time, in the right quantities, tone and context. This is not a counsel of despair. There are a small number of excellent negotiators around at your office, or home, ready to be analysed and copied.
APPENDIX A I POWER EXERCISES
The unpredictable loss of power by the apparently 'powerful'.
The passing of time may complicate GOALS, RIGHTS and POWER.
1. An elderly Italian couple were defending a claim by their daughter to a share of their 5 acre properly on which she had built a business. They stonewalled her law suit and requests for a share of their property. They were rich, determined, with nothing else to do but fight, and were culturally outraged at their daughter's lack of respect. Suddenly, they accepted a written offer which gave the daughter a substantial portion of what she wanted. Why? 2. A wife accepted an offer of a $2 million payout in a matrimonial property dispute. Two mornings later, she went to her lawyer and changed her mind. The lawyer was nervous that she would complain to the Law Society about being 'coerced' into a settlement, so he agreed to argue her case for more money. He doubted her success, as $2 million was in the range, she had willingly signed a settlement, and was represented by a lawyer. One year later, at the door of the court, the husband's expert valuer was suddenly disqualified from giving evidence as it emerged that he once had owned shares in a company owned by the husband. Rather than wait another 10 months for a new valuer and trial date, the husband agreed to pay her an extra $500 000. Why?
3. At a mediation about the division of $14.5 million, the lawyers for a husband and wife agreed publicly that the range of awards which a judge might make to this wife was between 20%-33%$. The husband's first offer was 19%; and the wife claimed 40% (ie an 'insult' offer). The husband then bid against himself 19% -25% -30% -32%. Why? 4. A cane farmer was awarded 52% payout from his cane farm; and his wife 48% (and actual ownership of the heavily mortgaged cane farm) by a trial judge. However the trial judge made a mathematical error when calculating the wages due to their son, who had worked on the farm, being approximately $500 000. The parties came to mediation to recalculate the son's correct wages. However, the husband said he now wanted 57% of the assets, paying zero wages to his despised son. His lawyers said that he had no 'rights' to 57%, and that a court would confirm the 52:48 split, with an amount for wages 'off the top' for his son. All of these were established to some extent by repeated research projects in various cultures.
All of these principles have exceptions; and can be over-used or under-used.
A
Consistency Principle
Most people like to act consistently with principles they agree with; or like to rationalise consistency between their own beliefs and behaviours. and union officials; builders and subcontractors) will tend to reach agreement as each will need the good will of the other on hundreds of occasions in the future. Nevertheless, they may engage in theatrical aggression for the sake of constituents, so try not to overreact except theatrically. (l) Be reliable and trustworthy. (m) When you believe that others are behaving 'badly', name what they are doing and advise them of your perception. (n) Be careful about 'winning' negotiations in ongoing relationships (eg: with children, spouses, employees). There will be (severe) paybacks. (o) Normally, begin business or litigious negotiations 'high-soft' or 'low-soft' so that there is room to make concessions and expect concessions in exchange. Learn the code language to make it clear to others that this is a 'high-soft' or 'low-soft' offer.
D
Similarity Principle
We tend to feel more relaxed with, and more persuaded by, people who are similar to us in belief, appearance, profession, language, and sense of humour.
Consequences: (a) Pick your own negotiation team members carefully.
(b) Ask a lot of questions about the style and characteristics of all possible 'opposition' members. (c) Subtly or overtly request that certain people attend negotiations; or not attend; or be isolated in separate rooms.
(d) Try to find negotiators to 'match' influential or aggressive negotiators on the other side.
E
Scarcity and Nothing-To-Lose Principle
A person or group who has, or is perceived to have, little or nothing to lose by the 'failure' of the negotiation, is normally very powerful in negotiations (eg: Wealthy bank or insurer; impoverished student; McLibel; agents such as lawyers, union representatives or armies). Conversely, if a resource is apparently scarce and is perceived to be unavailable elsewhere, sign up now.
Consequences: (a) Always try to have acceptable alternatives to the current negotiations (eg: alternative car dealers). (b) Conversely, create monopolies! (c) Beware of spending too much time and money negotiating with time-rich, unemployed, asset-poor, articulate martyrs ('resentniks'). (d) Try to discover intangible goals of: 'I have nothing to lose' negotiators (eg: need for recognition; publicity; vengeance, etc) and check this list with that apparently powerful person(s). (e) Try to include in the negotiations tribal members, who may have some influence over the powerful (eg: a union; a consumer association; a spouse; a newspaper reporter). (f) Give the nothing-to-lose powerful negotiator something to lose (eg: to a powerful bank: the possibility of de-registration or prosecution as a monopoly; to an impoverished group of terrorists: give some jobs; houses; mortgages; status; children; etc). (g) Beware of people who say: 'I don't care'; 'I can walk away'; or 'You don't have any choice'; 'You can't fight a bank / insurance company'. They may be correct, or dangerously deluded.
F Coalition Principle
Where a majority of people in a group come to a clear agreement, it is difficult for the minority to change that coalition's consensus.
Consequences: (a) Prepare consensus statements / petitions by a number of key people before or during any negotiation. (b) Brief key people to confirm the opinion of some or all negotiation team after the negotiation is over. (c) Coach a negotiation team / tribe / organisation not to split, and/or speak through one representative, during negotiations. 
